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Competitive Information Spread with Confirmation
Bias in Cyber-Social Networks
Yanbing Mao and Emrah Akyol
Abstract—This paper studies competitive information spread
with confirmation bias in the cyber-social networks that com-
prises individuals in social networks and competitive information
sources in cyber layer. The competitive information spread is for-
mulated as a zero-sum game between the competitive information
sources, whose pure Nash equilibrium is demonstrated to exist.
The derived Nash equilibrium depends on the innate opinions,
social network topology and parameters of confirmation bias.
Nash equilibriums in the scenarios of neutral and extremal group
of innate opinions are also investigated. Numerical examples in
the context of the well-known Krackhardt’s advice network are
provided to demonstrate the correctness of theory results.
Index Terms—Competitive information spread, confirmation
bias, zero-sum game, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion formation in social networks has attracted signifi-
cant attentions, and there exists a rich literature on dynamics
of opinion evolution, see e.g., [1]–[4]. This paper considers
the dynamics of cyber-social networks proposed in [5], [6],
that is adapted from DeGroot model [1], DeGroot-Friedkin
model [2] and Hegselmann-Krause model [3]. The considered
social network model [5], [6] comprises important factors on
opinion evolution: (i) subconscious bias, (ii) conformity, (iii)
confirmation bias.
This paper studies competitive information spread in the
cyber-social networks. In recent years, different forms of
competitive information spread have been studied in social
networks. Dhamal et al. [7] incorporated opponent stubborn
agents into DeGroot-Friedkin model, where the cost function
is the sum of individuals’ expressed opinions that means in-
dividuals’ opinions have identical importance/influence in the
decision making of competitive camps. Proskurnikov et al. [4]
proposed a opinion dynamics with hostile camps, who have
negative influence on the opinion evolution of the controlled
individuals. By the similar polar evolution mechanism, Xia
et al. [8] proposed a novel model of trust–mistrust social
networks. Employing a diffusion dynamics, Eshghi et al. [9]
studied optimal allocating of a finite budget across several
advertising channels. However, all of these studied competitive
problems [4], [7]–[9] ignored individual confirmation bias that
has recently gained revived interest due to its role in the spread
of misinformation, particularly due to its impact on creating
an environment for misinformation to thrive in.
We formulate the competitive information spread with con-
firmation bias as a zero-sum game. It is well-known that indi-
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viduals do not have identical influences in social community,
see e.g., electoral college in US presidential election, more
members of congress a state owns usually contribute to more
electors for the state. Inspired by this, we incorporate the
eigenvector centralities that measure individuals’ influences
into the cost function of the game, such that the competi-
tive information sources unequally treat individuals’ opinions
according to their influences in social community.
In this paper, building on the zero-sum game. We first
investigate the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. We next
derive the pure Nash equilibrium through solving the min-max
strategy. The obtained pure strategy depends on individuals’
innate opinions, the social network topology, as well as the
parameters of confirmation bias. Finally, we analyze Nash
equilibrium in the scenarios of neutral and extremal group
of innate opinions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present
preliminaries that include notation, social network model, as
well as its converged unique equilibrium. In Sections III and
IV, we study the existence and value of pure Nash equilibrium,
respectively. We next present numerical simulations in Section
V. We finally present our conclusions and future research
directions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let Rn and Rm×n denote the set of n-dimensional real
vectors and the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices,
respectively. N represents the set of the positive integers, and
N0 = N ∪ {0}. We define 1 as the identity matrix with
proper dimension. Moreover, we let 1n denote the vector of all
ones. The superscript ‘⊤’ stands for the matrix transposition.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, ‖x‖ stands for its l1 norm, i.e.,
‖x‖ =
n∑
i=1
|xi|. Given a matrix W = [wij ] ∈ R
n×n, ‖W‖1 =
max
j=1,...,n
{
n∑
i=1
|wij |}, ‖W‖∞ = max
i=1,...,n
{
n∑
j=1
|wij |} [10].
The social network considered in this paper is composed
of n individuals. The interaction among the individuals is
modeled by a digraph G = (V,E), where V = {v1, . . . , vn} is
the set of vertices representing the individuals and E ⊆ V×V
is the set of edges representing the influence structure. Assume
that the social network has no self-loops, i.e., for any vi ∈ V,
(vi, vi) /∈ E.
2B. Social Network Model
We now introduce the model of cyber-social network from
[5], [6] to describe the dynamics of opinion evolution in the
presence of confirmation bias:
xi(k + 1) = αi(xi(k))si +
∑
j∈V
wijxj(k) + wi(xi(k))h
+ wi(xi(k))g, i ∈ V, (1)
where
1) xi(k) ∈ [0, 1] is individual vi’s opinion at time k, si ∈
[0, 1] is her fixed innate opinion, h and g are the opinions
of competitive information sources u and u, respectively,
that satisfy
1 ≥ h ≥ max
i∈V
{si} , 0 ≤ g ≤ min
i∈V
{si} ; (2)
2) wij represents the weighted influence of individual vj
on individual vi,
wij =
{
> 0, if (vi, vj) ∈ E
= 0, otherwise;
3) wi(xi(k)) and wi(xi(k)) are the state-dependent in-
fluence weights of information sources u and u on
individual vi that capture “confirmation bias”:
wi(xi(k)) = β − γ |xi(k)− h| , (3a)
wi(xi(k)) = β − γ |xi(k)− g| ; (3b)
4) αi(xi(k)) is referred to as the “resistance parameter” of
individual vi, is determined in such a way that it satisfies
for ∀i ∈ V and ∀k ∈ N0,
αi(xi(k)) +
∑
j∈V
wij + wi(xi(k)) + wi(xi(k)) = 1. (4)
For the innate opinions, let us define:
s , max
i∈V
{si} , s , min
i∈V
{si} ,
by which the relation (2) can be equivalently transformed to
s ≤ h ≤ 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ s. (5)
We now rewrite (1) in the following vector form:
x(k+1)=A(x(k))s+Wx(k)+W(x(k))h+W(x(k))g, (6)
where we define:
s, [s1, . . . , sn]
⊤
∈ Rn, (7a)
x(k), [x1(k), . . . , xn(k)]
⊤
∈ Rn, (7b)
W , [wij ] ∈ R
n×n, (7c)
A (x(k)),diag{α1(x1(k)) , . . . , αn(xn(k))}∈R
n×n, (7d)
W (x(k)), [w1(x1(k)), . . . , wn(xn(k))]
⊤
∈ Rn, (7e)
W (x(k)), [w1(x1(k)), . . . , wn(xn(k))]
⊤
∈ Rn. (7f)
We need to make the following assumption that guaran-
tees the non-negativeness of resistance parameters and state-
dependent influence weights (3), and the convergence of social
dynamics.
Assumption 1: Given W ∈ Rn×n, β ∈ R and γ ∈ R, we
have:
β ≥ γ ≥ 0, (8a)
1−max {‖W‖
∞
, ‖W‖1} ≥ max {2β, 4γ} . (8b)
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, the resistance parame-
ters αi(xi(k)) ≥ 0, the state-dependent influence weights
wi (xi(k)) ≥ 0 and wi(xi(k) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ V, ∀k ∈ N, and
the dynamics (6) converges to a unique equilibrium that is
independent of initial opinions.
Proof: See Appendix B.
C. Equilibrium of Social Dynamics
We now define the following matrices to present the equi-
librium of social dynamics (1):
E , 1−W + (g − h) γ1 ∈ Rn×n, (9)
W , diag
∑
j∈V
w1j ,
∑
j∈V
w2j , . . . ,
∑
j∈V
wnj
 ∈ Rn×n. (10)
Corollary 1: The social dynamics (6) converges to a unique
equilibrium:
x∗(g, h) = E−1 (1−W − 2β1+ (h− g)γ1) s
+ E−1
(
(h+ g)β1n + (g
2 − h2)γ1n
)
. (11)
Proof: See Appendix C.
III. COST FUNCTION
In social networks, the innate opinions rely on inherent
personal characteristics (e.g., socio-economic conditions in
which the individual grew up and/or lives in) [2], and the
social network topology with its coupled influence weights
correspond to individuals’ inter-personal appraisals that rely on
trust and trends to vary little over a long period of time. Hence,
through controlling innate opinions and weighted network
topology precisely to influence public opinions is not practical.
The remaining feasible control variables for the information
sources are their own opinions. The weight function (3) and
the convex combination (4) indicate that through strategically
expressing their opinions, information sources can influence
individuals’ resistance parameters and the state-dependent
weighted influences, consequently, influence public opinions.
The relation (11), in conjunction with (9), shows that the
public expressed opinions are nonlinear functions of opinions
of information sources. Before proceeding on, we first present
the following auxiliary lemma that can simplify the analysis
of the best responses of competitive information sources.
Lemma 1: The matrix E defined in (9) satisfies:
c⊤E
1− λ+ (g − h) γ
= c⊤, (12)
where c = [c1, c2, . . . , cn]
⊤ ∈ Rn is the eigenvector associated
with the largest eigenvalue λ of W⊤, i.e.,
W⊤c = λc, λ = max
i∈V
{λi(W )} . (13)
3Proof: See Appendix D.
Through assigning relative scores to all individuals in
network based on the concept that high-scoring individual
contributes more influence to her followers’ opinion evolutions
than low-scoring individual, c in (13) is referred to the
vector of out-eigenvector centralities that measures of the
importance of an individual in influencing other individuals
[11]. Unlike the cost function used for competitive camps
that treats individual expressed opinions equally [7], the cost
function f(g, h) considered in this paper comprises individual
importance according to the out-eigenvector centrality:
f(g, h) = c⊤x∗(g, h), (14)
where x∗(g, h) is computed via (11).
In this paper, we model the competitive information spread
as a zero-sum game with two players Alice and Bob that
refer to information sources who forwards opinions h and g,
respectively. Obviously, using (14) as the cost function, Alice’s
objective is to maximize f(g, h), while Bob’s objective is to
minimize f(g, h).
We now rewrite the cost function in term of control vari-
ables, i.e., the opinions of information sources.
Corollary 2: The cost function (14) can be equivalently
expressed as:
f(g, h) =
1
1−λ+(g−h)γ
((1− 2β + (h−g)γ)ŝ− χ
+ (h+g)β + (g2−h2)γ
)
c⊤1n, (15)
where
ŝ ,
1∑
i∈V
ci
cisi, , (16)
χ ,
1∑
i∈V
ci
∑
i∈V
ci
∑
j∈V
siwij . (17)
Proof: See Appendix E.
To end this section, we give the partial derivatives pertaining
to the cost function in (15).
∂f(g, h)
∂h
=
q(g, h) c⊤1n
(a1 − γh)
2 , (18)
∂f(g, h)
∂g
=
m(g, h) c⊤1n
(a2 + gγ)
2 , (19)
where
q(g, h) , (β + γŝ− 2γh)a1 + b1γ + γ
2h2, (20)
m(g, h) , (β − γŝ+ 2γg)a2 + g
2γ2 − b2γ, (21)
with
a1 = 1− λ+ γg, (22)
b1 = (1 − 2β − gγ)ŝ− χ+ gβ + g
2γ, (23)
a2 = 1− λ− hγ, (24)
b2 = (1− 2β + hγ) ŝ+ hβ − h
2γ − χ. (25)
IV. EXISTENCE OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Zero-Sum Game
The max-min optimization of cost function in general from
is written as max
h
min
g
{f (g, h)}. In this scenario, Alice ex-
presses her opinion h as leader who knows the rational reaction
of follower Bob. We denote the interested strategies for this
optimization as the pair (g∗, h∗) such that
g∗ (h) , argmin
g∈[0,s]
{f (g, h) , for all h ∈ [s, 1]} , (26a)
h∗ , argmax
h∈[s,1]
{f (g∗ (h) , h)} . (26b)
We note that (26a) indicates the follower Bob knows all of
the opinion strategies of the leader Alice, and Bob always
takes this into account in computing his best response g∗ (h).
Meanwhile, (26b) implies that the leader Alice knows the
best response of the follower Bob, and then expresses her
opinion h∗ that maximizes her payoff, which anticipates the
best response of Bob. Bob actually observed this and expressed
expected opinion.
The min-max optimization of control objective in general
from is written as min
g
max
h
{f (g, h)}. In this scenario, Bob
behaves as the leader who knows the rational reaction of
follower Alice. The interested strategies are referred to the
pair (h∗, g∗) such that
h∗ (g) , argmax
h∈[s,1]
{f(g, h), for g ∈ [0, s]} , (27a)
g∗ , argmin
g∈[0,s]
{f(g, h∗(g))} . (27b)
Equation (27a) indicates the follower Alice knows all of
the opinion strategies of the leader Bob, and (27b) implies
that the leader Bob knows the best response of Alice, and
then expresses his opinion g∗ that minimizes his payoff,
anticipating the predicted best response of Alice.
For the two players Bob and Alice, it is well-known that
under their best responses:
max
h∈[s,1]
min
g∈[0,s]
{f (g, h)} ≤ min
g∈[0,s]
max
h∈[s,1]
{f (g, h)} . (28)
B. Existence Problem
Let us first consider the strategic form game:
Definition 1: [12]–[14] A strategic form game is a triplet〈
I, (Si)i∈I, (ui)i∈I
〉
, where
• I is a finite set of players.
• Si is a non-empty set of available actions for player i.
• ui : S → R is the cost function of player i, where S =∏
i∈I Si.
We now present a lemma regarding to the existence of pure
Nash equilibrium of games with infinite strategy sets.
Lemma 2: [12]–[14] Consider a strategic form game〈
I, (Si)i∈I, (ui)i∈I
〉
with infinite strategy sets such that for
each i ∈ I:
Si is convex and compact, (29)
ui(si, s−i) is continuous in s−i, (30)
ui(si, s−i) is continuous and quasiconcave in si. (31)
4The game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 2 we can conclude the existence of pure Nash
equilibrium for the competitive information spread problems
(26) and (27), which is formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: Under (8), the pure Nash equilibrium (g∗, h∗)
exists for the competitive information spread problems (26)
and (27), under which the equality in (28) holds.
Proof: See Appendix F.
V. PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
This section investigates the pure Nash equilibrium. We will
use the following scalars to describe Nash equilibrium.
m(0, 1) = (1− λ− 2γ + 2ŝγ)β + (λŝ+ γ + χ− 2ŝ)γ,
m(s, 1) = (s2γ − ŝ+ 2βŝ− γŝ− β + γ + χ)γ
+ (β − γŝ+ 2γs)(1− λ− γ),
q(0, 1) , (β + γŝ− 2γ)(1− λ) + (ŝ− 2βŝ− χ+ γ)γ,
q(0, s) = (ŝ− 2βŝ− χ+ γs2)γ + (β + γŝ− 2γs)(1− λ),
r(0) =
1−λ−
√
(1−λ)(1−λ−β)−(2−λ−2β)γŝ+ γχ
γ
,
w(1) =
√
(1−λ)(1−λ−2γ−β)+2βγ−χγ+(2−λ−2β)γŝ
γ
−
1
γ
+ 1 +
λ
γ
,
from which it verifies that
m(0, 1)≤m(0, s), q(0, 1)≤q(0, s). (32)
Using the relations in (32), the Nash equilibrium is pre-
sented as follows.
Theorem 3: Under (8), pure Nash equilibrium (g∗, h∗) for
the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27)
exists as
• If m(0, 1) ≥ 0,
(g∗, h∗) =

(0, 1), if q(0, 1) ≥ 0
(0, s), if q(0, s) ≤ 0
(0, r(0)), otherwise.
(33)
• If m(s, 1) ≤ 0,
(g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (34)
• Otherwise,
(g∗, h∗) = (w(1), 1). (35)
Proof: See Appendix G.
The following examples give the factors in the conditions
of pure strategies.
Example 1 (No Confirmation Bias): The relation (3) in-
dicates that if γ = 0, no individual holds conformation
bias towards the opinions of information sources. Substituting
γ = 0 into q(0, 1) and m(0, 1) straightforwardly results in
q(0, 1) ≥ 0 and m(0, 1) ≥ 0.
Example 2 (Innate Opinions, Network Structure, Confirma-
tion Bias Parameters): Let us consider λ = 910 , ŝ =
1
4 and β =
γ, inserting which into (21) yieldsm(0, 1) = (− 12γ−
7
40+χ)γ.
Thus, if χ ≤ 12γ +
7
40 , m(0, 1) ≤ 0.
Based on Theorem 3, this section investigates Nash equilib-
riums in the scenarios of neutral and extremal group of innate
opinions, and no confirmation bias.
A. Neutral Innate Opinions
For the social network topology, let us refer L ∈ Rn×n to
its Laplacian matrix, i.e.,
[L]ii ,
∑
j∈V
wij ; [L]ij , −wij , i 6= j ∈ V. (36)
The following corollary formally states that the existence of
pure Nash equilibrium in this scenario depends on the group
of innate opinions and social network structure.
Corollary 3: If the group of innate opinions and social
network topology satisfy
ŝ =
1
2
, c⊤Ls ≥ 0, (37)
the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive informa-
tion spread problems (26) and (27) as
(g∗, h∗) =

(0, 1), if q(0, 1) ≥ 0
(0, s), if q(0, s) ≤ 0
(0, r(0)), otherwise.
(38)
Proof: See Appendix H.
Remark 1: The condition ŝ = 12 in (37) represents the
scenario where the mean of the group of innate opinions
is neutral. Corollary 3 indicates that in this scenario, Bob’s
strategy in Nash equilibrium is independent of innate opinions,
weighted social network topology and confirmation bias .
B. Extremal Innate Opinions
We note that ŝ = 0 indicate that s = s = 0. Let us substitute
ŝ = s = s = 0 into q(0, 0), q(0, 1) and r(0), and denote them
by q˜(0, 0), q˜(0, 1) and r˜(0) in this scenario:
q˜(0, 0) , β − βλ− χγ,
q˜(0, 1) , (γ − χ)γ + (β − 2γ)(1− λ),
r˜(0) ,
1− λ−
√
(1− λ)(1 − λ− β) + χγ
γ
.
It verifies from (21) that m(0, 1) ≥ 0 in this scenario. We
straightforwardly obtain the pure Nash equilibrium, which is
formally stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: If the group of innate opinions satisfies ŝ = 0,
the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive informa-
tion spread problems (26) and (27) as:
(g∗, h∗) =

(0, 1), if q˜(0, 1) ≥ 0
(0, 0), if q˜(0, 0) ≤ 0
(0, r˜(0)), otherwise.
5For ŝ = 1 that indicates s = s = 1, let us substitute ŝ =
s = s = 1 into m(0, 1), m(1, 1) and w(0), and denote them
by mˆ(0, 1), mˆ(1, 1) and mˆ(1):
mˆ(1, 1) , χγ + β − βλ− λγ, (39)
mˆ(0, 1) , β − λβ + (λ+ γ + χ− 2)γ, (40)
wˆ(1) ,
λ+γ−1+
√
1−β+(λ+γ+β−2)λ−χγ
γ
. (41)
Corollary 5: If the group of innate opinions satisfies ŝ = 1,
the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive informa-
tion spread problems (26) and (27) as
(g∗, h∗) =

(0, 1), if mˆ(0, 1)≥0
(1, 1), if mˆ(1, 1)≤0
(wˆ(1), 1), otherwise.
C. No Confirmation Bias
By Example 1, m(0, 1) = q(0, 1) ≥ 0 in the scenario of no
confirmation bias.
Corollary 6: When no individual holds confirmation bias
towards the opinions of information sources. i.e., γ = 0, the
pure Nash equilibrium for the competitive information spread
problems (26) and (27) is (g∗, h∗) = (0, 1).
Remark 2: Corollary 6 indicates that when no individual
holds confirmation bias, Nash equilibrium is independent of
innate opinions, weighted social network topology, as well the
influences from information sources.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 Bob
Alice
Fig. 1. Krackhardt’s advice network [15] in the presence of competitive
information sources Alice and Bob.
In this section, we verify the derived strategies in the well-
known Krackhardt’s advice network [15] with 21 individuals.
The network topology is shown in Fig. 1, where Alice and Bob
represent two competitive information sources. For the weight
matrix W , if individual vi asks for advice from her neighbor
vj , then wij =
1
25+Γin
i
for all the individuals vj that influence
individual vi, where Γ
in
i denotes in-degree of individual vi.
For the innate opinions, we set s =
[
0.2, 0.2, 0.751⊤19
]⊤
.
A. In The Absence of Confirmation Bias
For the parameters of confirmation bias, let us set β = 0.06,
and γ = 0. We note that γ = 0 indicates that no individual
holds confirmation bias toward the opinions of Alice and Bob.
By Corollary 6, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in this sce-
nario is (g∗, h∗) = (0, 1), which is numerically demonstrated
by Fig. 2 (a).
B. In The Presence of Confirmation Bias
We now consider more realistic situation where individuals
hold confirmation bias. For the confirmation bias, we let
β = γ = 0.06. It obtains from the innate opinions and social
network topology:
s = 0.2, s = 0.75, ŝ = 0.7265, χ = 0.1693, λ = 0.2369.
By these parameters, we compute from (20) and (21) that
q(0, 1) > 0, m(s, 1) < 0 and m(0, 1) < 0. Then, from
Theorem 3 we obtain the Nash equilibrium in this scenario
as (g∗, h∗) = (s, 1) = (0.2, 1) that is demonstrated by Fig. 2
(b).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the competitive information
spread with confirmation bias over cyber-social networks.
Pure Nash equilibrium points are investigated. Theoretical
results are verified by numerical examples. There are several
directions implied by the factors of competitive strategies for
future work; some of which can be listed as follows.
• We will investigate on the exact inference of group
innate opinions, social network topology and parameters
of confirmation bias.
• We will incorporate group centralities into the cost
function to identify the critical group of individuals in
information spreading.
6Fig. 2. Surface plot: (a) cost function in the absence of confirmation bias, (b) cost function in the presence of confirmation bias.
APPENDIX A
AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Lemma 3: [16] Let G = (V,E) be a connected weighted
graph. There exists a positive eigenvector c¯ such that
Ac¯ = λ¯c¯,
where λ¯ > 0 is the largest eigenvalue (has multiplicity 1) of
the weighted adjacency matrix A with non-negative entries.
Lemma 4: Under (8), the scalars q(g, h) andm(g, h) defined
by (20) and (21) satisfy m(g, h) + q(g, h) ≥ 0 holds.
Proof: The partial derivative of (21) w.r.t. g is straight-
forwardly obtained as
∂m(g, h)
∂g
= 2γa2 + 2γ
2g. (42)
Noticing the eigenvalue λ given in (13), the condition (8), in
conjunction with Gerˇsgorin disk theorem [17], imply that
1− λ ≥ 1−max {‖W‖1, ‖W‖∞} > max {2β, 4γ} , (43)
which together with (24) and the fact 0 < h < 1 imply that
a2 > 0. Thus, we conclude from (42) that
∂m(g, h)
∂g
≥ 0, for g, h ∈ [0, 1]. (44)
The partial derivative of (21) w.r.t. h satisfies:
∂m(g, h)
∂h
= −2(β − γ(h− g))γ ≤ 0, for g, h ∈ [0, 1]. (45)
Following the same steps to derive (44) and (45), we obtain
from (20) that
∂q(g, h)
∂g
= 2(β+(g−h)γ)γ≥0, for g, h∈ [0, 1], (46)
∂q(g, h)
∂h
= −2(1−λ+(g−h)γ)γ≤0, for g, h∈ [0, 1]. (47)
By (44) and (46), and (45) and (47), we have
m(g, h) + q(g, h) ≥ m(0, 1) + q(0, 1). (48)
With the consideration of (8), substituting m(0, 1) and
q(0, 1) into (48) yields
m(g, h)+q(g, h) ≥ 2(1−
λ
2
− γ − γλ)β + 2γ2 + 2γλ
≥ 2γ + λγ − 2γ2λ = 2γ(1− γλ) + λγ ≥ 0.
Lemma 5: Consider f(g, h), q(g, h) and m(g, h) given by
(15), (20) and (21), respectively. If q(g, h) ≥ 0, m(g˜, h˜) ≥ 0,
g ≥ g˜ and h ≥ h˜, then f(g, h) ≥ f(g˜, h˜).
Proof: It follows from (47) that q(g, h) ≥ 0 implies
q(g, h˘) ≥ 0 for h˘ ∈ [h˜, h] ⊆ [s, 1], and g ∈ [0, s]. Then,
from (19) we have f(g, h) ≥ f(g, h˜). Meanwhile, following
from (46), m(g˜, h˜) ≥ 0 indicates that m(g˘, h˜) = 0 for
g˘ ∈ [g, g˜] ⊆ [0, s]. We obtain from (19) that f(g, h˜) ≥ f(g˜, h˜).
Therefore, we conclude that f(g, h) ≥ f(g, h˜) ≥ f(g˜, h˜).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Noticing si, xi(0) ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ V, by the convex combi-
nation (4) we have xi(k) ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the non-negativeness
of state-dependent influence weights (3) directly follows from
(8a).
It is straightforward to obtain from the relation (4) that
αi(xi(k))
= 1−
∑
j∈V
wij − wi(xi(k))− wi(xi(k))
= 1−
∑
j∈V
wij − 2β + γ (|xi(k)− h|+ |xi(k)− g|) (49)
≥ 1−
∑
j∈V
wij − 2β, (50)
where (49) is obtained via considering (3). The relation (50)
indicates that to guarantee the non-negativeness of αi(xi(k)),
we require 1−
∑
j∈V
wij ≥ 2β for any i ∈ V, or equivalently,
1− ‖W‖
∞
≥ 2β. (51)
7Let us denote xi(k + 1) and xi(k) by f˜i(xi) and xi,
respectively. Then, following from (1) we have
f˜i(xi)− f˜i(yi)
=(αi(xi)−αi(yi))si+
∑
j∈V
wij(xj−yj)+(wi(xi)−wi(yi))h
+(wi(xi)−wi(yi))g, i ∈ V. (52)
We obtain from (49) that
|αi(xi)−αi(yi)| = γ (|xi−h| − |yi−h|+ |xi−g| − |yi−g|)
≤ 2γ |xi − yi| . (53)
Moreover, from (3) we have
|wi(xi)−wi(yi)|=γ ||yi−h| − |xi−h||≤γ |xi−yi| , (54a)
|wi(xi)−wi(yi)|=γ ||yi−h| − |xi−h||≤γ |xi−yi| . (54b)
Combining (52) with (53) and (54) yields
‖f(x)− f(y)‖ =
∑
i∈V
|fi(xi)− fi(yi)|
≤ 4γ
∑
i∈V
|xi − yi|+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
wij |xj − yj|
= 4γ
∑
i∈V
|xi − yi|+
∑
i∈V
|xi − yi|
∑
j∈V
wji
≤ 4γ
∑
i∈V
|xi−yi|+
∑
i∈V
|xi−yi|max
i∈V
{
∑
j∈V
wji}
= (4γ + ‖W‖1) ‖x− y‖ , (55)
which implies that to guarantee the convergence to a unique
equilibrium that is independent of initial opinions (via the
well-known Banach fixed-point theorem used in the proof of
Theorem 1 in [6]), we require 4γ+‖W‖1 < 1, or equivalently,
1− ‖W‖1 > 4γ. (56)
Combining (51) and (56) yields the condition (8b).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
By Theorem 1, the unique equilibrium of the social dynam-
ics (6) is independent of initial opinions, hence we can set
g1n ≥ x(0) ≥ h1n to solve x
∗(g, h). In the scenario, under
the linear convex combination (4) and the relation (5), we have
h1n ≥ x(k) ≥ g1n for ∀k, consequently,
h1n ≥ x
∗(g, h) ≥ g1n. (57)
With (57), the state-dependent weights (3) at the steady state
satisfy:
wi(x
∗
i (g, h)) = β − hγ + γx
∗
i (g, h), (58a)
wi(x
∗
i (g, h)) = β + gγ − γx
∗
i (g, h), (58b)
and the resistant parameters are obtained from (4) as:
αi(x
∗
i (g, h)) = 1−
∑
j∈V
wij − 2β + (h− g) γ, i ∈ V. (59)
Due to the relations (58) and (59), the social dynamics (6)
at the steady state is
x∗(g, h) = (1−W−2β1+(h−g) γ1) s+Wx∗(g, h)
+ (h+g)β1n + (h−g)γx
∗(g, h) + (g2−h2)γ1n,
from which the equilibrium (11) is obtained straightforwardly.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since W is an adjacency matrix and its transposition does
not change its eigenvalues, by Lemma 3 in Appendix A we
have (13). It follows from (9) and (13) that
c⊤E = c⊤ − c⊤W + (g − h)c⊤γ = (1− λ+ (g − h)γ)c⊤,
from which (12) is obtained straightforwardly.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Substituting (11) and (12) into (14) yields:
f (g, h)
=
c⊤
1−λ+(g − h)γ
((1−W − 2β1+ (h− g)γ1) s
+(h+ g)β1n + (g
2 − h2)γ1n
)
=
∑
i∈V
ci
1−λ+(g−h)γ
∑
i∈V
(1−
∑
j∈V
wij−2β+(h−g)γ)
cisi∑
i∈V
ci
+
∑
i∈V
((h+g)β+(g2−h2)γ)
ci∑
i∈V
ci
,
which is equivalent to (15) via considering (17) and (16).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let us first transform the zero-sum games (26) and (27) to a
strategic form game with I = {Alice,Bob}, uBob(sBob, sAlice)
= −f(g, h), uAlice(sAlice, sBob) = f(g, h), SBob = [0, s] and
SAlice = [s, 1]. In the followings, we only need to prove the
conditions in Lemma 2 hold in this setting.
Obviously, both SBob and SAlice are convex and compact,
which satisfies (29).
The relation (15) indicates either uBob(sBob, sAlice) or
uAlice(sAlice, sBob) is continuous. Thus, (30) holds.
We note that (47) means uAlice(sAlice, sBob) is continuous
and quasiconcave in sAlice. (44) is, in fact, equivalent to
−∂m(g,h)
∂g
≤ 0, which means uBob(sBob, sAlice) is continuous
and quasiconcave in sBob. Thus, (31) is satisfied.
8APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
As Theorem 2 states that Nash equilibrium exists for the
games (26) and (27). Therefore, we only need to study min-
max or max-min strategy to derive Nash equilibrium. In the
proof, we study the max-min problem (26).
Based on (44) and (45), the rest of proof considers five
different cases with the following defined scalars:
δ(g),−
√
(β + 2gγ)(β + λ− 1)− (λ+ 2β − 2)ŝγ − χγ
γ
+ g +
β
γ
(60)
r(g),−
√
(1−λ)(1−λ−β+2gγ)−(2−λ−2β)γŝ−2gβγ+γχ
γ
+
1− λ
γ
+ g (61)
w(h),
√
(1−λ)(1−λ−2hγ−β)+(2−λ−2β)γŝ+2hβγ−χγ
γ
−
1−λ
γ
+ h. (62)
A. Case: m(0, 1) ≥ 0
Due to (44) and (45), m(0, 1) ≥ 0 indicates that given any
h ∈ [s, 1],
∂f(g, h)
∂g
≥ 0, for any g ∈ [0, s] (63)
which means f(g, h) is non-decreasing w.r.t. g. Thus, from
the definition (26a) we have
g∗(h) = 0. (64)
Let us insert (64) into (15) and take its derivative w.r.t. h:
df(g∗(h), h)
dh
=
q(0, h)c⊤1n
(1− λ− γh)2
, (65)
where q(0, h) is given by (20). We note that (47) indicates
that q(0, h) is non-increasing w.r.t. h. Thus, if q(0, 1) ≥ 0,
q(0, h) ≥ 0 for any h ∈ [s, 1]. We conclude from (65)
that f (g∗(h) , h) is non-decreasing w.r.t. h. Hence, by the
definition (26b), h∗ = 1. If q(0, s) ≤ 0, q(0, h) ≤ 0 for
any h ∈ [s, 1]. Thus, f (g∗(h) , h) is non-increasing w.r.t. h,
thus, h∗ = s. If q(0, s) > 0 and q(0, 1) < 0, it verifies from
(61) and (20) that q(0, r(0)) = 0. Then, from (65) we have
df(g∗(h),h)
dh ≥ 0 for h ∈ [s, r(0)] and
df(g∗(h),h)
dh < 0 for
h ∈ [r(0), 1], which implies h∗ = r(0). The equilibrium point
in this case is summarized as (33).
B. Case: m(s, s) ≤ 0
Due to (44) and (45), m(s, s) ≤ 0 implies that given any
h ∈ [s, 1], ∂f(g,h)
∂g
≤ 0 for g ∈ (0, s], from which and
definition (26a) we have g∗(h) = s. We now insert g∗(h)
into (15) and taking its derivative w.r.t. h, we arrive at
df(g∗(h), h)
dh
=
q(s, h)c⊤1n
(1− λ− γh+ γ)
2 . (66)
Due to (47), if q(s, 1) ≥ 0, q(s, h) > 0 for any h ∈ [s, 1].
We conclude from (66) that f(s, h) is non-decreasing w.r.t h,
thus, h∗ = 1. If q(s, s) ≤ 0, q(s, h) ≤ 0 for any h ∈ [s, 1].
Thus, f(g(h), h) is non-increasing w.r.t h, thus, h∗ = s. If
q(s, s) > 0 and q(s, 1) < 0, it verifies from (61) and (20)
that q(s, r(s)) = 0. Then, from (66) we have df(s,h)dh ≥ 0 for
h ∈ [s, r(s)] and df(s,h)dh < 0 for h ∈ [r(s), 1], which implies
h∗ = r(s). The equilibrium point is summarized as
if m(s, s) ≤ 0, (g∗, h∗) =

(s, 1), if q(s, 1)≥0
(s, s), if q(s, s)≤0
(s, r(s)), otherwise.
(67)
By Lemma 4, the condition m(s, s) ≤ 0 & q(s, s) ≤ 0 in
(67) does not hold. Moreover, “otherwise” represents q(s, 1) <
0 & q(s, s) > 0 & m(s, s) ≤ 0, which as well does not hold,
since it contradicts with q(s, 1) +m(s, 1) ≥ 0 that is implied
by Lemma 4. Therefore, the equilibrium point of the game
(26) in this case is
If m(s, s) ≤ 0, (g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (68)
C. Case: m(0, s) ≤ 0 & m(s, 1) ≥ 0
It follows from (45) thatm(0, s) ≤ 0 andm(s, 1) ≥ 0 imply
m(0, h) ≤ 0 and m(s, h) ≥ 0 for h ∈ [s, 1], which indicate
that
∂f(g,h)
∂g
≥ 0 for any g ∈ (w(h), s], and ∂f(g,h)
∂g
≤ 0
for any g ∈ [0, w(h)], where w(h) is given by (62). It is
straightforward to obtain from (26a) that g∗(h) = w(h), whose
derivative w.r.t. h is obtained as:
dg∗(h)
dh
=
dw(h)
dh
(69)
=1−
1−λ−β√
(1−λ)(1−λ−2hγ−β)+(2−λ−2β)γŝ+2hβγ−χγ
.
We now replace g in (15) by g∗(h) and take its derivative
w.r.t. h:
df(g∗(h), h)
dh
=
(r1r3+r2+(r1r4−r2)
∂g∗(h)
∂h
)c⊤1n
(a2+gγ)
2 , (70)
where we define:
r1 , 1− λ− hγ + γg
∗(h), (71a)
r2 , (1− 2β + hγ)ŝγ + hβγ − h
2γ2 − χγ
+ (β−γŝ+γg∗(h))γg∗(h), (71b)
r3 , β + ŝγ − 2hγ, (71c)
r4 , β − ŝγ + 2γg
∗(h). (71d)
Since g∗(h) = w(h) ≥ 0, from (62) we have√
(1−λ)(1−λ−2hγ− β)+(2−λ−2β)γŝ+2hβγ−χγ
≥ 1− λ− hγ ≥ 0. (72)
Moreover, 1−λ−hγ−(1−λ−β) = β−hγ ≥ 0, which means
1−λ−hγ ≥ 1−λ−β. Then, noticing (72) and (43), we arrive
at
√
(1−λ)(1−λ−2hγ − β)+(2−λ−2β)γŝ+2hβγ−χγ ≥
91−λ−hγ ≥ 1−λ−β ≥ 0, which, in conjunction with (69),
results in
0 ≤
dg∗(h)
dh
≤ 1. (73)
If r1r4 − r2 ≤ 0, it follows from (71) and (73) that
r1r3 + r2 + (r1r4 − r2)
dg∗(h)
dh
≥ r1r3 + r2 + r1r4 − r2
= 2 (1− λ− hγ + γg∗(h)) (β − hγ + γg∗(h)) ≥ 0, (74)
where the last inequality considers (43) and (8a).
Let us denote wmax = maxi∈V{
∑
j∈V
wij}. From (17) and
(16) we have:
χ ≤
1∑
i∈V
ci
∑
i∈V
cisiwmax = wmaxŝ. (75)
Then, it obtains from (71) that
(r1r3 + r2)− (r1r4 − r2)
= 2γ(g∗(h))2 − 2γh2 + 2hγŝ− 2g∗(h)γŝ+ hβ + g∗(h)β
− χ− 2βŝ+ h+ g∗(h) + λŝ− λh− λg∗(h) (76)
≥ −2γh2 + 2hγŝ+ hβ − χ− 2βŝ+ h+ λŝ− λh (77)
≥ −ŝβ − χ+ ŝ (78)
≥ (1− wmax − β) ŝ > 0, (79)
where (77) obtained from (76) considers (1 + β − λ− 2γŝ+
2γg∗(h))g∗(h) ≥ 0 (due to (43)), (78) obtained from (77)
considers −2h2γ + (2γŝ+ 1+ β − λ)h ≥ (1 + β − λ)ŝ since
1+β−λ+2γŝ
4γ ≥ 1 and h ∈ [ŝ, 1], (79) from (78) considers (75).
If r1r4 − r2 > 0, from (79) we have r1r3 + r2 ≥ r1r4 −
r2 > 0. Then, it follows from (73) that r1r3 + r2 + (r1r4 −
r2)
∂g∗(h)
∂h
≥ r1r3 + r2 > 0, which, in conjunction with (74)
and (70), results in
df(g∗(h),h)
dh ≥ 0. Here, we obtain h
∗ = 1
and g∗ = w(1), i.e.,
If m(0, s) ≤ 0 & m(s, 1) ≥ 0, (g∗, h∗) = (w(1), 1). (80)
D. Case: m(s, s) > 0 & m(0, 1) < 0 & m(0, s) > 0)
Due to (45), we obtain from m(0, 1) < 0 & m(0, s) > 0:
m(0, h) ≤ 0, h ∈ [δ(0), 1], (81a)
m(0, h) > 0, h ∈ [s, δ(0)). (81b)
where δ(0) is given by (60). It follows from (44) and (81b)
that m(g, h) > 0 for h ∈ [s, δ(0)) and g ∈ [0, s]. Thus, we
have g∗ = 0. Then, following the same analysis in Subsection
A, we arrive at
For h∈ [s, δ(0)), (g∗, h∗)=

(0, δ(0)), if q(0, δ(0))≥0
(0, s), if q(0, s)≤0
(0, r(0)), otherwise.
(82)
Following (47), both q(0, s) ≤ 0 and q(0, δ(0)) ≤ 0 imply
q(0, 1) ≤ 0. By Lemma 4, the conditions q(0, s) ≤ 0 &
m(0, 1) ≤ 0, and q(0, δ(0)) ≤ 0 & m(0, 1) ≤ 0 in the second
and third items of (82) do not hold. Therefore, (82) in this
case can be further degenerated as
For h ∈ [s, δ(0)), (g∗, h∗) = (0, δ(0)). (83)
If m(s, 1) ≥ 0, we have m(s, h) ≥ 0 for h ∈ [s, 1], which
follows from (45). With the consideration of (81a), following
the same analysis in Subsection C, we obtain
For h∈ [δ(0), 1) & m(s, 1)≥0, (g∗, h∗)=(w(1), 1). (84)
Moreover, since (83) and (84) are, respectively, based on
m(0, δ(0)) = 0 and q(w(1), 1) = 0. by Lemma 5 we have
f(w(1), 1) ≥ f(0, δ(0)). Then, from (83) and (84) we obtain
if m(s, s)>0 & m(0, 1)<0 & m(0, s)>0 & m(s, 1)≥0,
(g∗, h∗) = (w(1), 1). (85)
If m(s, 1) < 0, we have m(g, 1) < 0 for g ∈ [0, s], which
follows from (44). We note that m(0, s) > 0 implies that
m(g, s) > 0 for g ∈ [0, s]. Noticing (45), we conclude:
m(g, h) > 0 for any h ∈ [s, δ(g)], (86a)
m(g, h) ≤ 0 for any h ∈ (δ(g), 1], (86b)
where δ(g) is given by (60).
The derivative of δ(g) w.r.t. g is obtained from (60) as:
dδ(g)
dg
=
1−λ−β√
(β+2gγ)(β+λ−1)−(λ+2β−2)ŝγ−w¯γ
+ 1 > 0, (87)
where the inequality is obtained via considering (43). Ob-
viously, (87) indicates that δ(g) is strictly increasing w.r.t.
g. Thus, δ(s) ≥ δ(0). It verifies from (21) with (60) that
m(0, δ(0)) = 0 and m(s, δ(s)) = 0, which respectively imply
m(0, h) ≤ 0 and m(s, h) ≥ 0 for h ∈ [δ(0), δ(s)] (that is due
to (45)). Then, following the same analysis in subsection C,
we obtain
For h∈ [δ(0), δ(s)] & m(s, 1) < 0,
(g∗, h∗)=(w(δ(s)), δ(s)). (88)
Noticing (19), we obtain from (86b) that g∗ = s for h ∈
[δ(s), 1] Then, following the same analysis in subsection B,
we arrive at
For h∈ [δ(s), 1] & m(s, 1) < 0,
(g∗, h∗)=

(s, 1), if q(s, 1) ≥ 0
(s, δ(s)), if q(s, δ(s)) < 0
(s, r(s)), otherwise.
(89)
We note that due to (46), q(s, δ(s)) ≤ 0 implies q(s, 1) ≤ 0,
which, in conjunction with m(s, 1) < 0, results in a contra-
diction with Lemma 4. Thus, the conditions of the second and
the third items in (89) do not hold. Thus, (89) is degenerated
as
For h ∈ [δ(s), 1] & m(s, 1) < 0 & q(s, 1) ≥ 0,
(g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (90)
Noting q(s, 1) ≥ 0 in (90), m(w(δ(s)), δ(s)) = 0 in
(88), m(0, δ(0)) ≥ 0 in (83), w(δ(s)) ≤ s and w(1) ≤ s,
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by Lemma 5 we obtain f(s, 1) ≥ f(w(δ(s)), δ(s)) and
f(s, 1) ≥ f(0, δ(0)), which, in conjunction with (83), (88)
and (90), results in
If m(s, s)>0 & m(0, 1)<0 & m(0, s)>0 & m(s, 1)<0,
(g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (91)
E. Case: m(s, s) > 0 & m(0, 1) < 0 & m(s, 1) < 0)
Noticing (44), we obtain from m(s, s) > 0 & m(s, 1) < 0
that m(s, δ(s)) = 0, where δ(s) is given by (60). Conse-
quently,
m(s, h) ≤ 0, h ∈ [δ(s), 1], (92a)
m(s, h) > 0, h ∈ [s, δ(s)). (92b)
It follows from (44) and (92a) that m(g, h) ≤ 0 for h ∈
[δ(s), 1] and g ∈ [0, s]. Thus, we have g∗ = s. Then, following
the same analysis in Subsection B, we arrive at
For h∈ [δ(s), 1], (g∗, h∗)=

(s, 1), if q(s, 1)≥0
(s, δ(s)), if q(s, δ(s))≤0
(s, r(s)), otherwise
which reduce to the following via following the same analysis
to derive:
For h∈ [δ(s), 1] & q(s, 1) ≥ 0, (g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (93)
If m(0, s) ≤ 0, from (45) we have m(0, h) ≤ 0 for
h ∈ [s, 1]. With the consideration of (92b), following the same
analysis in Subsection C, we obtain
For h ∈ [s, δ(s)) & m(0, s) ≤ 0,
(g∗, h∗) = (w(δ(s)), δ(s)). (94)
Noticing m(w(δ(s)), δ(s)) = 0, q(s, 1) ≥ 0 in (93),
1 ≥ δ(s) and s ≥ w(δ(s)), by Lemma 5 we have f(s, 1) ≥
f(w(δ(s)), δ(s)). Consequently,
if m(s, s) > 0 & m(0, 1) < 0 & m(s, 1) < 0 & m(0, s) ≤ 0,
(g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (95)
If m(0, s) > 0, we have m(g, s) > 0 for g ∈ [0, s], which
is due to (44). We note m(s, 1) < 0 implies that m(g, 1) < 0
for g ∈ [0, s]. Here, we conclude (86). Considering (19), we
obtain from (86a) that g∗ = 0 for h ∈ [s, δ(0)] Then, following
the same analysis in Subsection A, we arrive at
For h∈ [s, δ(0)] & m(0, s) > 0,
(g∗, h∗)=

(0, δ(0)), if q(0, δ(0)) ≥ 0
(0, s), if q(0, s) < 0
(0, r(0)), otherwise.
which reduce to the following via following the same analysis
to derive:
for h∈ [s, δ(0)] & m(0, s) > 0 & q(0, δ(0)) ≥ 0,
(g∗, h∗) = ((0, δ(0)). (96)
Following the same analysis to derive (88), we obtain
For h∈ [δ(0), δ(s)] & m(0, s) > 0,
(g∗, h∗)=(w(δ(s)), δ(s)). (97)
Using the same analysis methods to derive (83) and (90)
from (82) and (89), respectively, the results (93) and (96), are
respectively, degenerated as
for h∈ [δ(s), 1] & q(s, 1)≥0, (g∗, h∗)=(s, 1), (98)
for h∈ [s, δ(0)] & q(0, δ(0)) ≥ 0, (g∗, h∗)=(0, δ(0)). (99)
We note that the obtained (99) from (96) is based on the
condition m(g, h) > 0 for h ∈ [s, δ(0)) and g ∈ [0, s],
which implies m(0, δ(0)) > 0. Then, by Lemma 5 we have
f(s, 1) ≥ f(0, δ(0)) and f(s, 1) ≥ f(w(δ(s)), δ(s)), which
together with (93), (96) and (97) result in
if m(s, s) > 0 & m(0, 1) < 0 & m(s, 1) < 0 & m(0, s) > 0,
(g∗, h∗) = (s, 1). (100)
F. Summary for Cases B–E
Combining (85) and (80) straightforwardly yields (35),
while combining (68), (91), (95) and (100) results in (34).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
We note that c⊤Ls ≥ 0 can be equivalently transformed to∑
i∈V
ci
∑
j∈V
(si − sj)wij
=
∑
i∈V
cisi
∑
j∈V
wij −
∑
i∈V
ci
∑
j∈V
wijsj ≥ 0. (101)
With the consideration of (13), we have∑
i∈V
ci
∑
j∈V
wijsj = c
⊤Ws = λc⊤s = λ
∑
i∈V
cisi. (102)
Noticing the condition ŝ = 12 and the definitions (17) and
(16), multiplying both sides of (101) by 1∑
i∈V
ci
yields
χ ≥
λ
2
. (103)
Inserting ŝ = 12 and (103) into (21) yields
m(0, 1) = (1− λ− γ)β + (
λ
2
+ γ + w¯ − 1)γ
≥ (1− λ− γ)β + (λ+ γ − 1)γ
= (β − γ) (1− λ− γ) ≥ 0.
Then, we straightforwardly obtain (38) from the first three
items in (33).
11
REFERENCES
[1] M. H. DeGroot, “Reaching a consensus,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association, vol. 69, no. 345, pp. 118–121, 1974.
[2] N. E. Friedkin and E. C. Johnsen, “Social influence and opinions,”
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, vol. 15, no. 3-4, pp. 193–206, 1990.
[3] R. Hegselmann, U. Krause et al., “Opinion dynamics and bounded con-
fidence models, analysis, and simulation,” Journal of artificial societies
and social simulation, vol. 5, no. 3, 2002.
[4] A. V. Proskurnikov, A. S. Matveev, and M. Cao, “Opinion dynamics in
social networks with hostile camps: Consensus vs. polarization,” IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 1524–1536, 2016.
[5] Y. Mao, S. Bolouki, and E. Akyol, “On the evolution of public opinion
in the presence of confirmation bias,” in 2018 IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 5352–5357.
[6] Y. Mao, S. Bouloki, and E. Akyol, “Spread of information with confir-
mation bias in cyber-social networks,” IEEE Transactions on Network
Science and Engineering, DOI: 10.1109/TNSE.2018.2878377.
[7] S. Dhamal, W. Ben-Ameur, T. Chahed, and E. Altman, “Optimal
investment strategies for competing camps in a social network: A broad
framework,” IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering,
DOI: 10.1109/TNSE.2018.2864575.
[8] W. Xia, M. Cao, and K. H. Johansson, “Structural balance and opinion
separation in trust–mistrust social networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Control of Network Systems, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 46–56, 2016.
[9] S. Eshghi, V. Preciado, S. Sarkar, S. Venkatesh, Q. Zhao, R. D’Souza,
and A. Swami, “Spread, then target, and advertise in waves: Optimal
budget allocation across advertising channels,” IEEE Transactions on
Network Science and Engineering, DOI: 10.1109/TNSE.2018.2873281.
[10] R. A. Horn and C. R. Johnson, “Matrix analysis cambridge university
press,” New York, 1990.
[11] M. Newman, Networks. Oxford university press, 2018.
[12] G. Debreu, “A social equilibrium existence theorem,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 38, no. 10, pp. 886–893, 1952.
[13] K. Fan, “Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topolog-
ical linear spaces,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America, vol. 38, no. 2, p. 121, 1952.
[14] I. L. Glicksberg, “A further generalization of the kakutani fixed point
theorem, with application to nash equilibrium points,” Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 170–174, 1952.
[15] D. Krackhardt, “Cognitive social structures,” Social networks, vol. 9,
no. 2, pp. 109–134, 1987.
[16] D. Spielman, “Spectral graph theory (Lecture 3: Laplacian and Adja-
cency Matrices),” Lecture Notes, Yale University: 740–0776, 2009.
[17] R. Horn, “C. johnson, matrix analysis. cambridge,” 1985.
